By MUNIR AKRAM | From today’s Wall Street Journal Asia
Whoever is elected president of the United States this week will face imposing challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan that require a new and comprehensive foreign policy strategy. Such a strategy will, by necessity, break away from the current political misperceptions and military missteps, and embrace a deeper understanding of the culture, traditions, needs and political motivations of both nations. Conducting business as usual will be a recipe for disaster. From my perspective as a long-time Pakistani diplomat, here are 10 elements for a new, realistic and successful regional strategy for the candidates to consider:
1. Understand the difference between the Taliban and al Qaeda, then focus on eliminating al Qaeda. We need a realistic approach to the Taliban. It is al Qaeda, not the Taliban, that threatens the U.S. homeland. Separating al Qaeda from the Taliban will make it easier for the U.S., Pakistan and allied intelligence, police and military operations to disrupt the group’s operational system.
2. Open negotiations with the Taliban. The insurgency in south and east Afghanistan was initially confined to Taliban fighters, although most Pashtuns there and in the northern Pakistan were unhappy at the U.S.-sponsored ejection of the Pashtun Taliban regime by the Tajik-led Northern Alliance. A series of political and military mistakes, however, by the U.S.-led NATO forces, and the corruption and incompetence of Kabul, have combined to alienate the entire populace of the region and to transform the insurgency virtually into a Pashtun war of liberation. Foreign forces have never pacified this region and U.S.-NATO forces will not succeed in doing so, either.
The offer made last week by the Afghan-Pakistan Jirga, a tribal council, to open talks with the Taliban, and the U.S.’s willingness to consider this, are welcome signs of realism. While negotiations should be pursued from a position of strength, preconditions and exclusions will doom them before they begin. Also, negotiations cannot be credibly pursued by Kabul, Islamabad, the U.S., NATO, not even the U.N. A commission, composed of respected Pashtun leaders, Islamic scholars and neutral personalities, should be created to conduct unconditional talks with the Taliban and seek an immediate cessation of attacks and suicide bombings. The Taliban will expect to share power and will demand the withdrawal of foreign forces. A reasonable time frame for such withdrawal could be linked to their cooperation in restoring peace and stability and creation of a credible Afghan Army.
3. Revise U.S.-NATO military strategy. Aerial action, which has led to high civilian causalities, should be the exception, not the rule. At present, NATO garrisons should be deployed in credible strength in a limited number of locations to be used for protective or punitive purposes. Eventually, a credible and genuinely national Afghan Army will enable foreign forces to undertake an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan.
4. Reform the Afghan security apparatus. The Defense, Intelligence and Interior Departments cannot continue to be left in the hands of the Panjsheri faction of the Northern Alliance, which has an anti-Pashtun and anti-Pakistan agenda. The officer corps of the fledging Afghan Army should reflect Afghanistan’s ethnic composition, including the Pashtuns, if it is to be a genuine national institution.
5. An effective war must be launched against drugs, criminality and corruption. This is a principal cause feeding popular disaffection and insurgency. Rather than destroy poppy fields, the crops of the poorest farmers could be purchased for less than $500 million by the U.N. for medicinal use. In a dialogue with the Taliban, perhaps a first proposal should be joint action against drug cultivation and trafficking.
6. Peace will have to be built locally. Throughout history, Afghanistan’s tribes have resisted strong central control and agreed to be governed loosely from Kabul. Peace will have to be built region by region through power-sharing arrangements among the most influential people in each area, including tribal and religious leaders.
7. The U.S. should resist the temptation to intervene unilaterally against the so-called safe havens in Pakistan. It should help Pakistan address the militancy itself in its frontier regions. The situation there is extremely complex. U.S. reluctance to provide Pakistan with advanced counter-insurgency equipment and technology, and to share real-time intelligence, enhances a suspicion in some Pakistani quarters that the U.S. or some of its agencies may be complicit with the Afghans and Indians in seeking to destabilize Pakistan. Under these circumstances, unilateral U.S. intervention in Pakistan will intensify tensions between the two countries with potentially dangerous consequences.
8. Adopt a positive agenda to secure Pakistan’s effective cooperation. A centerpiece should be a massive program (cost: $20 billion) for Pakistan’s economic stabilization and rapid growth and development (cost around $10 billion annually), as well as preferential market advancement and investment flows.
9. Pursue a policy of equity between Pakistan and India. A major impediment to a positive Pakistani role in the region is the growing, if unspoken, fear in Islamabad of the implications of the strategic relationship that is developing between the U.S. and India, epitomized by the recent Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. The U.S. can regain considerable good will and leverage with Pakistan if it adopts a policy of equitable treatment for India and Pakistan on technology, trade and military issues.
10. Support regional security cooperation. Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can be stabilized while the intelligence agencies of regional states continue their activities against each other. To this end, a conference should be convened with neighboring countries and other major powers to agree on regional security arrangements that ensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and Pakistan and noninterference in their internal affairs. This should be accompanied by an agreement to promote Afghanistan and Pakistan as the hub for trade and transit between South and Central Asia, China and the Gulf. This could lay the foundation for durable peace and economic dynamism.
As the U.S. continues to review its policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, there must be movement toward a more realistic strategy. To sweep away the conservative Islamic nature of Afghan society is not possible. Therefore, the U.S. needs to focus on fighting al Qaeda, separate it from the Taliban and, if possible, secure their cooperation in stabilizing the region. The next administration in the White House will need to revise the military’s approach, build peace locally in Afghanistan, have a positive agenda toward Pakistan and build a regional consensus for peace among local actors. Only then will peace and stability be achieved.
Mr. Akram is former Permanent Representative to the United Nations from Pakistan.
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